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For a third of a century, from 1873 to 1905, Iceland ranked high 
among the emigration areas of Europe, the annual number of 
migrants per 1000 reaching about 13 for 1885-8g1 and almost 
equalling that of Norway for the enti're period. 
After 1905 Icelandic emigration is, by contrast, relatively in- 
significant. I t  drops sharply in 1906, before the American panic of 
1907, and after the crisis it never recovers to anything like the same 
extent as in the Scandinavian countries or the British Isles. 
Before 1873 emigration is conspicuous by its almost total absence, 
even around 1870 when it is rampant in every country with which 
Icelanders have contacts. This situation deserves a closer look. 
The years 1859 through '72 were in Iceland characterized by 
agricultural distress (resulting from climatic deterioration and a 
sheep epidemic) and sluggish population growth (0.2 % p.a.). The 
latter reflects partly the echo effect on fertility, but only partly as 
both mortality and age-specific fertility are involved. The fertility 
drop occurred with the largest cohorts of adults still in their mid- 
twenties, we11 below the average age of parents, which may suggest 
that the previously fast-growing (1.4 % p.a.) population was now 
pressed against the ceiling of resources, lowered by the harsh climate. 
This impression is strengthened by the increasing size of households 
and above all by reduced nuptiality, especially a t  lower ages. One 
can hardly doubt that many Icelanders experienced a lowering of 
their living standards and that the young people in particular were 
now confronted by much more limited opportunities than their 
parents in the 1840's and '50's. The Icelanders would, in other 
words, have had the most classic economic reasons to emigrate 
before 1873. 
Let us not forget those few who did, even to original destinations 
like Utah and Brazil. 
Mormon missionaries (converted in Denmark) recruited some 
sixteen emigrants in the late 1850's. The mission was resumed in 
1872 and contributed to the mass emigration in the following years, 
but only locally; the most important foci of emigration were un- 
touched by Mormonism. 
As early as 1859 thc bad outlook for agriculture had prompted the 
inhabitants of the bard-hit North to contemplate emigration and 
even to form an association for that purpose. Somehow they came to 
set their hopes upon Iree or assisted passage to BraziI and repeatedly 
contacted Brazilian agents. But they faiIed in their arrangements for 
transport. The first smalI group (except for a few explorers) did not 
reach their chosen country until 1873 when the tide was already 
turning, and the hundreds of people registered for emigration to 
Brazil quietly dropped the plan. 
With the exception of one man of Danish origin who migrated to 
the Middle West in 1865,2 Icelanders showed no indication of 
joining the main stream of Scandinavian emigrants during the 
1860's. The Brazilian project may have arrested the initiative, and 
emigration with no hope of assisted passage was perhaps regarded as 
idIe speculation for the poor Icelanders. Information was, no doubt, 
scarce and organized transport non-existent. 
Not untiI 1870 did a trickle of emigration start (4, 12, and 23 
known emigrants in that and the two subsequent years, respectively), 
directed towards the Middle West. Well-off families and vigorous 
young persons traveIled on their own to Britain or Denmark where 
they could get the services of emigration agents. Xewspaper cover- 
age of America increased sud-denly and a collection of letters from 
America was translated and published. 
The breakthrough occurred in 1873 with emigration in one jump 
up to 5%,, surpassed already in the following year, and (after a 
year's pause) reaching its first peak of at  least 17%, in 1876. 
What had happened? Simply that Iceland had got its first emi- 
gration agency, that of the Allan Line. The agent advertised that 
the line would send a ship for a sufficiently large party of emigrants. 
Interested people in one area took the initiative, formed an associa- 
tion (like the ill-fated Brazilian one and centered in the same region) 
and sent a messenger to collect subscriptions in large parts of the 
country. I n  the spring of 1873 more than 14%, of the whole nation 
had subscribed for emigration to either Brazil or North America. 
The AIlan Line did not send the emigrant ship but the agent 
managed to arrange an inexpensive journey to Scotland for the 
largest single group (about 150 out of 350). Smaller groups travelled 
as ordinary passengers to Scotland or even to Denmark and Norway, 
in the latter cases obviously refusing the services of the AlIan 
agency. 
The next year the Allan Line sent an emigrant ship to two ports 
of call in Iceland; few people now travelled by other (more expen- 
sive) means. A similar round trip was made to four ports in 1876, 
now prepared by the publication of pamphlets and the activities of 
Canadian government agents in Iceland. 
I do not suggest that the transportation offer was by itself sufficient 
to plunge Iceland into a state of mass emigration. Other circum- 
stances must also be considered. 
From about 1870 the climate grew milder again and fish catches 
were relativeIy good; one has every reason to assume that the 
economy was expanding and that Iiving standards were rising. But 
so were expectations, and progressively larger cohorts reaching 
adult age kept up the population pressure. Nor were Nature's 
favours unfailing : a volcanic eruption in 1875 affected emigration 
regionally, and the same may be true of bad spring weather in 1872. 
O n  balance it is possible that the economic "push" to emigrate 
increased during the early 1870's, but not by leaps and bounds. 
Political discontent certainly peaked in 1871-73; political motives 
were mentioned in an apologetic context by emigrant  leader^,^ and 
these may have made some difference, although politics can hardly 
be envisaged as the prime mover of the ordinary emigrant. 
Bearing in mind the general course of European emigration one 
may assume that by 1870 the "push/puIl" action was strongly felt 
in Iceland but counteracted by initial obstacles. Perhaps the most 
crucial turning point ought, indeed, to be placed here, when 
emigration became continuous and increasing, although on a 
miniature scale, and information began to flow in. Nevertheless it is 
clear that the organized transport system established in 1873 did 
lower the threshold of obstacles enormously and so initiated emigra- 
tion on a mass scale. 
Now let us temporarily turn to another peculiarity of Icelandic 
emigration: the fact that the emigrants overwhelmingly settled in 
Canada rather than the United States.* 
The young Dominion of Canada made the promotion of immigra- 
tion one of its first priorities, especially after the westwards expan- 
sion of 1870. I t  tried to outbid its southern neighbour by a more 
generous Homestead Act, free inland passage, and lowered ocean 
fare together with a propaganda campaign in collaboration with the 
Allan Line.5 The establishment of an agency in Iceland must be 
seen as a part of this drive; one can speculate how far it was a keen 
response to the signs of emigration beginning and how far it was an 
active step to create a new recruiting area; in any case it was hardly 
an accident that the Allan Line oE all lines made the Icelandic 
venture. 
Generally this Canadian effort was a failure. The volume of 
European emigration began to shrink at the most inopportune time, 
and the dwindling stream of immigrants proved particularly 
difficult to deflect from its traditional destinations in the United 
States, probably even more so because it was dwindling and so, 
one may assume, to an unusual degree derived from earlier immi- 
gration. 
Not so in Iceland. Icelandic emigration had hardly any tradi- 
tional direction (although Wisconsin was chosen by most of the 
pre-1873 emigrants). I t  may have been extraordinarily cost- 
sensitive since the domestic price level was relatively low and money 
scarce. And the Icelandic emigrants were looking for a special kind 
of place to go. They.wanted to form a separate settlement, a New 
Iceland. A farming community, of course, and they wanted to go 
directly there without an intervening wagc-earning period. I n  
assessing sites, arable land was not paramount as they were only 
used to livestock farming, and they were more repelled by out- 
landish inconveniences like locusts than familiar ones like cold. 
I n  the spring and early summer of 1873 most Icelandic emigrants 
went to the United States. The largest group departed late, accom- 
panied by the line's agent. He  persuaded most of the passengers to 
change their destinations from the Middle West to Muskoka, 
0 n t a r i 0 . ~  And why shouldn't they comply? Their homesteads in 
Wisconsin were not ready; instead they had, to their disappoint- 
ment, been advised to take work as farm hands with Norwegian 
farmers. Money was short as their livestock had sold badly; free 
inland travel a Iong way in roughly the desired direction must have 
weighed a lot with them. 
I n  1874 practically all Icelandic emigrants intended to join their 
countrymen in Ontario; contemporary sources give free travel and 
a generous homestead offer as  reason^.^ The Icelanders had, how- 
ever, fared so badly in Nuskoka that the authorities directed the 
newcomers to Kinmount, but they fared no better. I n  1875 there 
was little emigration. The New Iceland had evidently not been 
found but i t  was being actively sought, and prospective ,emigrants 
were advised to wait back home because of the depressed American 
labour market. 
Three projects for the establishment of a New Iceland were 
proposed, all dependent upon special privileges. The first was 
sponsored by the government of Nova Scotia, which offered land 
and assistance in addition to that provided by the Homestead Act. 
Settlement began already in 1875, and the experience soon per- 
suaded the government not to sponsor further development of the 
co10ny.~ I n  the same year a settlement in Alaska was proposed but it 
depended upon assisted passage. President Grant (for whom the 
slow development of the newly bought Alaska was a political lia- 
bility) was won over to the idea, but Congress was not and that 
toppled the p r ~ j e c t . ~  The third proposal was for an Icelandic colony 
in the Canadian West, on the model of the Mennonite settlements of 
1874. A site was found on Lake Winnipeg (then outside the boun- 
daries of Manitoba) and Icelanders granted exclusive settlement 
rights and limited self-government. The settlement was sponsored 
and financially assisted by the Canadian government, partly for 
humanitarian reasons as the plight of that unfortunate people 
seemed equally cruel in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and back in Iceland. 
(Besides, special cases, like the Mennonites and the Icelanders, 
seemed to be the only possibility to populate the Canadian West.)lo 
This last New Iceland (as was its official name) provoked a true 
exodus of enthusiastic Icelanders, from Eastern Canada already in 
the autumn of 1875 and from Iceland in the following year. Then 
there was little emigration in 1877 as New Iceland was quarantined 
because of smallpox, but in 1878 and '79 i t  again attracted hundreds 
of immigrants. 
I n  the early 1880's New Iceland suffered natural and social 
calamities and the idea of a unified and exclusive Icelandic se-ctle- 
ment was, in practice, given up. But by then Winnipeg had become 
the urban center of the Icelandic ethnic community and the most 
natural stepping stone for new immigrants, gradually encircled by 
Icelandic settlements. The pattern of emigration to Canada, thus 
established and reinforced by government-sponsored propaganda 
and even (in 1893) loans to pay fares, was not seriously disrupted, 
even if the Canadian economy did not, until 1896, compare 
favourably with that of the United States. 
This course of events suggests why the Hcelandic pioneers were 
relatively unaffected by the American depression, so fateful to 
European emigration in general. Not only would Icelanders have 
rather imprecise information about developments across the A.tlantic 
and no clear standards of normalcy by which to judge them (this 
would apply to any people in its earliest phase of emigration) ; they 
also intended to become immediateIy largely self-sufficient as farmers 
and thus able to disregard the American labour market. The 
Canadian offer of a separate settlement was aIso a special "pull" 
factor. 
From a more general point of view the emigration history of any 
nation (or other appropriate unit of observation) may be seen as 
the interaction of two logically distinct chains of events. One is the 
much discussed progression through the peaks and troughs ol the 
L C  emigration cycle", economically determined and parallel for all 
parts of Europe. The other is the once-and-for-all passage through 
the sequential phases of emigration,ll a social rather than a purely 
economic phenomenon, similar in outline in most countries but 
different in its timing. (As far as I know there is a regrettable lack 
of comparative studies throwing light upon the interaction between 
the two, without which any study of the former on the macro level 
must be rather risky.) I n  Iceland, emigration potential had built 
up during the protracted intoductory phase to be suddenly re- 
leased when the transport revolution of 1873 marked the beginning 
of the growth phase. This development completely overruled the 
downturn of the general emigration cycle, for reasons partly ex- 
plained above. That downturn may even have led the AIIan Line 
and Canadian authorities to intensify their recruiting efforts which 
in  turn demonstrably speeded up the Icelandic phase sequence. 
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